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ON NONCOOPERATIVE NONLINEAR 
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES1 
TOMÁŠ ROUBÍČEK 
Noncooperative games with systems governed by nonlinear differential equations remain, 
in general, nonconvex even if continuously extended (i.e. relaxed) in terms of Young 
measures. However, if the individual payoff functionals are "enough" uniformly convex and 
the controlled system is only "slightly" nonlinear, then the relaxed game enjoys a globally 
convex structure, which guarantees existence of its Nash equilibria as well as existence of 
approximate Nash equilibria (in a suitable sense) for the original game. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The concept of Nash equilibria [10] for noncooperative games requires typically a 
convex structure both of sets of admissible strategies and of the individual payoff 
functionals. This represents a severe restriction on the class of problems investigated. 
Considering games involving a controlled system governed by differential equations, 
called differential games, a relaxation (i.e. a natural extension by continuity) in 
terms of the Young measures [22] (also called relaxed controls or mixed strategies) 
as e. g. in Balder [1-3], Gamkrelidze [6], Krasovskii and Subbotin [8], Nikol'skii [12], 
Nowak [13], or Warga [21] can help to some extent: it can convexify the originally 
nonconvex sets of admissible strategies as well as original payoffs with respect to 
the strategies no matter how nonlinear they are. However, the required convexity 
structure of the relaxed problem still represents a considerable restriction: in gen­
eral cases, only controlled systems linear with respect to the state can be treated. 
Sometimes, a special interplay of the data enables us to admit nonlinear systems, 
too; it seems that the only reference to such phenomena is Lenhart et al [9] for the 
case of a certain special elliptic game. 
In this paper we want to pursue this idea in a more general manner by combination 
of the relaxation with the technique used in other occasions to prove sufficiency of 
the maximum principle; see Gabasov and Kirillova [5; Section VII.2] or, for the case 
of general integral processes, also Schmidt [18]. (Yet, we will use it more carefully 
to avoid the discrepancy of requirements of uniform convexity and boundedness 
1This research was partly covered by the grant No. 201/96/0228 of the Grant Agency of the 
Czech Republic. 
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of the fiгst derivative simultaneously, which appeared incidentally in [5].) By this 
technique one can show the convex structure foг the relaxed pгoblem even if the 
controlled system is "slightly" nonlinear with respect to the state on the assumption 
that the individual payoff functionals aгe "enough" uniformly convex with гespect 
to the state. To reduce technicalities, we confine ourselves to the cases wheгe the 
state and the strategies are additively coupled, the nonlinearities in the strategies 
being arbitrary. 
We want to illustrate here this idea on the simplest case where the controlled sys-
tem is governed by ordinary diíferential equations, the number of playeгs is only two, 
and the sets of admissible strategies are bounded in L°°-norm. Let us only remark 
that the generalization to many-player games with partial differential equations or 
integral equations and with admissible stгategies bounded only in an Lp-norm is 
possible; cf. in particular [16] foг a game with systems of elliptic equations. 
Hence, we will consideг the following two-peгson non-coopeгative game for a 
system of nonlineaг ordinary difTerential equations, having additively coupled state 
and strategy terms, with individual payofTs also additively coupled (except the term 





/ ^i(^y) + Лi(/,îii) + ^(ť,îXi,ii2)dť ( l s t playeг payofT) 
Jo 
/ ^(ťiУÌ + Л г í ^ ^ - ^ ť ^ t i ь i i г Ј d ť (2 n d player payoff) 
v Jo 
subject to — = G(t, y) + Hi(t, ui) + H2(t, u2) (state equation) 
2/(0) = Vo, (initial condition) 
Ui(t)€Si(t), (strategy 
u2{t) GS2(t) for a. a. t G (0,T), constraints) 
y€W 1 *(0 ,T ; lR n ) 
U i G l ^ ^ . T j I R " 1 1 ) , U26L°°(0,T;lRm2). 
where g, : (0,T) x IRn — IR, G : (0,T) x ffi,n — IR", h, : (0,T) x IRm' — IR, 
H, : (0, T) x IR"1' -»• IR" and <p : (0, T) x IRmi x IRmi - • IR, y0 e ffi.", and moreover 
Si : (0,T) ^t IRm' are multivalued mappings, / = 1,2. Moreover, the notation for 
the Sobolev space W1J ,(0,T;lRn) = {y € L°°(0,T;nin); dy/df e Lp(0,T;IRn)} and 
for the Lebesgue spaces L"(0,T;lRn) and / ^ ( C r i n f " ' ) is standard. Supposing 
p G (l ,+oo], the basic data qualification we will need are the following: 
gi, G, hi, Hi, <p are Caratheodory functions, (Lla) 
i.e. measurable in / € ( 0 , T ) and continuous in the resting variables, 
3 a e I p ( 0 , T ) 3 6 6 I R : \G{t,r)\ < a(t) + b\r\, \H,(t,s)\< a(t), (1.1b) 
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3teLl(0,T): \G(t}r\)-G(t,r2)\<£(t)\r\-r2l (1.1c) 
3aeLl(0yT): \gi(t,r)\ < a(t), | / i /(M)| < a(t)t \tp(t, su s2)\ < a(t), (Lid) 
Si is bounded, closed-valued and has a measurable graph, i.e. ( l - l e ) 
{(t)s)e(0)T)x]R
mi
] seSl(t)} G SLebes6ue(0,^)®5:BOrel(^l
m,), 
where / = 1,2 and SLebesgue(0, T) and SBorei(-Rm') denote respectively the cr-algebra 
of Lebesgue measurable subsets of (0,T) and the Borel <r-algebra on IRm|. 
The strategies u\ and u2 represent the strategies of the particular players while y 
is the state response. The game (G) has got the structure of finding Nash equilibria 
of the payoffs $ i , <£2 : Ui x U2 -* IR, defined by 
$i(ui,u2):= / ^ ( ^ ( " b ^ T / i i i M i ) - (-l)
l<p{t,ui,u2)dt (1.2) 
Jo 
with y = y(u\,u2) G VV
1,p(0,T;IRn) being the unique solution to the initial-value 
problem 
^ = G(t,y) + H1(t,ul) + H2{t,u2), y(0) = yo, (1.3) 
while the sets of admissible strategies Ui and U2 are defined by 
U,:----{uGL~(0,T;IRm'); ui(t)eSi(t) fora.a. / G ( 0 , T ) } , (1.4) 
Nhere / = 1,2 distinguishes the particular players. Let us recall that the pair of 
strategies (1*1,1*2) G U\ x U2 is called a Nash equilibrium for the game (G) if 
$1(^1,^2) = min ®\(u\yu2) k $2(u\,u2) = min $2(^1,1*2). (1.5) 
wi€C1i t-2GC/2 
Such equilibria, however, do not exist unless quite strong data qualification are 
imposed. Instead of seeking a precise equilibrium, it is practically satisfactory to 
find at least an approximate equilibrium. In analogy with minimizing sequences used 
standardly in cooperative situations, here it is natural to speak about the so-called 
equilibrium sequences introduced in [15]: a sequence of strategies {(u\, i*2)}jfceiN will 
be called an equilibrium sequence if 
3 # 1 : Ui -> IR : lim $i(-, u\) = * i point-wise, (1.6a) 
k—>oo 
3 t f 2 : U 2 - » I R : lim $2(u\, •) = ty2 point-wise, (1.6b) 
fc—>oo 
lim * i (u j ) = inf * i (u ) & lim ̂ ( u * ) = infuG(/2 *2(u). (1.6c) 
fc—•oo u£Ui A:—>oo 
This definition just means that the sequences {i*i}jteiN and {i*2}jbeiN are minimizing 
with respect to limit payoff functions determined by the sequence of opponent's 
strategies. A bit other concept has been invented by Patrone [14]: {(1*1, t*2)}fceiN is 
called an asymptotically Nash equilibrium if 
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3 { ( e i . 4 ) } * 6 i N C ( 0 ) + o o ) x (0,+oo) : l im£ j = 0 & lim e\ = 0, (1.7a) 
k—*oo k—*oo 
* i (« i ,«{ | )< inf « i ( u , u | ) + ef & *2(«i >":,)< inf * 2 ( « f , t i ) + e | . (1.7b) 
uGCli u£U2 
The pair (i-ijti*) satisfying (1.7b) is also called (ef, £2 Equilibrium; see also Kindler 
[7], Tan, Yu and Yuan [19] or Tijs [20]. It should be emphasized that, contrary to 
minimizing sequences whose existence in cooperative situations is always guaranteed, 
the equilibrium sequences or asymptotically Nash equilibria in the sense of Patrone 
[14] need not exist in general, cf. also [14; Example 3]. However, we will prove their 
existence under a suitable data qualification; cf. Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2. Let us 
also note that, in general, one cannot suppose any relation between (1.6) and (1.7). 
However, it holds: 
Propos i t ion 1.1. Let {(u\, ti^jibeiN be an equilibrium sequence such that (1.6a,b) 
hold not only point-wise but even uniformly, i.e. let (1.6) hold together with 
lim sup |$ i ( t i . t i£ ) - t f i ( t i ) | = 0 k lim sup |$2(tif, u) - * 2 ( t i ) | = 0. (1.8) k^°°ueux
 k-+°°ueu2 
Then {(tif, ti2)}jteiN is also an asymptotically Nash equilibrium in the sense of Pa-
trone [14]. 
P r o o f , Put af := ^/( i i f )- infu €( / , */(ti) for / = 1,2 and b\ := s u p ^ ^ |$i(ti, ti*) 
—^i(ti)| and 63 := supuGL-2 |$2(tii , ti) — ^2( t i) | . Since, for any ti G Ui, it holds 
Vl'i(ti) > ^i(t if) — a\ and |$i(ti, u\) — *i( t i ) | < b\, we can estimate 
^(u\,uk2) < *i(ti}) + 6{ < *i(ti) + a*+6* < $l(u,u
k
2) + a\+2b\. 
Analogously, we get also $2(tiJ, ti*) < <J>2(tii, ti)+a2+26* for any ti G f/2. Therefore, 
the pair ( t i * , ^ ) forms an (a\ +261,0* +262)-equilibrium. By (1.6c), we know that 
limjb—oo a* = 0 and, by (1.8), we also know that limjk—oo 6* = 0. This proves 
{(tij,^2)}kG-N to be an asymptotically Nash equilibrium. • 
2. A RELAXED GAME AND ITS STRUCTURE 
Following ideas by Young [22], for / = 1, 2, we extend the sets of admissible strategies 
Ui from (1.4) to the set of admissible relaxed strategies 
Uf= {v G y(0 ,T;IR m ' ) ; supp(i/,) C St(t) for a. a. * G (0,T)}, (2.1) 
where supp(l/f) stands for the support of the measure vt and the set of the so-called 
Young measures (cf. [22] where however Co(-Rm')* instead of rca(IRm') is used) is 
defined by 
y ( 0 , T ; I R m i ) : = { ^ G L ~ ( 0 , T ; r c a ( I R m ' ) ) : (2.2) 
vt := v(t) is a probability measure for a. a. t G (0,T)} 
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where L~(0,T;rca(IRm ')) = L^O, T;C 0 (IR
m ' ) )* denotes the linear space of weakly 
measurable mappings t H-> vt : (0,T) -> rca(IR
m ') and rca(IRm ') ^ C 0 (IR
m ' )* stands 
for Radon measures on IR m ' , and CV^IR77*') denotes the Banach space of continuous 
functions IRm' —+ IR vanishing at infinity. The natural (norm,weak*)-continuous 
imbedding i, : L°°(0, T; IR m ' ) — }>(0, T; IRm ') is defined by it : u >-+ v with vt = 6u(t) 
where 6S G rca(IR
m ') denotes the Dirac measure supported at s G IR m ' . Let us note 
that ii(Ui) C U/. 
The relaxed game is then created by the continuous extension of the original game 
(G) from Ui x U2 to Ui x U2, which gives: 
J\(v\,v2,y) := / (gi(t,y)+ / hi(t,si)vi}t(dsi) 
JO V JIRmi 
+ / / ip(t^sUS2)^2Ads2)l/lA(isl)) d t 
JIRmi JHm2 ' 
«/2(^i,^2,y) : = / (g2(t,y)+ / h2(t,s2)v2ft(
ds2) 
JO X JRm2 
- / / <r?(^S1,S2)i/2)t(d52)/Vi)<(d5i)) dt 
JIRmi JHm2 ' 
$ = G(t, y) + ( H,{t, s) uu{ds) + [ H2{t, s) u2<t{ds) 
Ut JRml JRm2 
2/(0) = yo, 
supp(i/i(t) C Si(t) , supp(l/2jt) C S2(t) for a. a. *G(0,T), 
2/GKy1'P(0,T;IRn), vx G y ( 0 , T ; I R
m i ) , ^ 2 G ^ ( 0 , T ; I R





To investigate the structure of the relaxed game (TIG) more in detail, let us define 
the extended payoffs $1 , $ 2 : Ui x U2 —» IR by 
<Ьl{vi,V2):= Jì{vi,V2,y{V].,V2)) , 1=1,2, (2.3) 
where y = y(v\, v2) G W
1,p(0) T\ IR
n) denotes the unique solution to the initial-value 
problem 
^j=G{t,y)+ I H1{t,s)vlit{ds) + I H2{t,s)v2<t{ds), y{0) = y0. (2.4) 
&t JlRmi J]Rm2 
Obviously, (JIG) just represents a Nash equilibrium search over Ui x U2 of the 
extended payoffs $1 and <l2; this means we are to find (v\) v2) G U\ x U2 such that 
$1(^1,^2) = mm $i(vi,v2) and ^2(^1,^2)= min <l2(i/i, i>2). (2.5) 
i>ieUi V2tu2 
The main results about (JIG) and relations between (TIG) and (G) are supported by 
the properties stated in the following four lemmas. 
Lemma 2.1 . Let (Lie) be valid. Then, for / = 1,2, the set of admissible re-
laxed strategies U/ defined by (2.1) is convex and weakly* compact, and contains 
492 T. ROUBÍČEK 
densely the set of original strategies Uj imbedded into L^(0,T;rca(IRm')) via the 
imbedding f/. 
P r o o f . See Sainte-Beuve [17; Corollary 4] for a general case. For a special 5/ 
such result can be also found e. g. in Gamkrelidze [6; Theorem II.2] or in Warga [21; 
Theorem IV.2.6], or also in [15; Theorem 3.1.6 and Remark 3.1.10]. • 
L e m m a 2.2. Let (1.1a-d) be valid. Then, for / = 1,2, the extended payoff <£/ 
from (2.3)-(2.4) is a separately (weak*xweak*)-continuous extension of the orig-
inal payoff <$/ from (1.2)-(1.3). Moreover, $ i + $2 • U\ x U2 —• -R is jointly 
(weak* x weak*)-continuous. 
P r o o f . The (weak*,weak)-continuity of the mapping }>(0,T;IRm') -> I7(0,T; 
IRmi) : v\ 1—• (t H-> JJJ^,,,, Hi{t, s) ^/,t(ds)) for / = 1, 2 is obvious. From this one gets by 
standard arguments, including also the compactness of the imbedding VV1,p(0, T; IRn) 
C L°°(0, T; IRn), the (weak* x weak*,weak)-continuity of the mapping y(0, T; IRmi )x 
y(0,T;IRm 2) -+ Wrl»P(0,T;IRn) : (uuu2) ^y = yiyiM) from (2.4). As this map-
ping (tVi,i/2) 1—• 2/(^1,^2) is continuous to the norm topology of L°°(0,T; IR
n) and 
also the Nemytskii mapping y »-.> [t >-+ gi(t,y(t))] : L°°(0,T;IRn) -+ L^O,?1) is 
continuous, the functional 
( 1 / 1 , 1 / 2 ) ^ / 9i(t,y(vuV2))<ti (2.6) 
Jo 
is (weak*xweak*)-continuous, too. Also 
rp 
{yuVi)y-* I f hi(t,s)vl,t(d8)dt {2.1) 
JO JlRm. 
is obviously continuous. The remaining term in the payoff functional, i.e. 
( ^ 1 , ^ 2 ) ^ / / / <p[t,sus2)v2,%{&s2)vitt{&si)&t (2.8) 
JO JlRm- JIRm2 
is, however, not jointly (weak*xweak*)-continuous in a general case, cf. e.g. Warga 
[21; Sections IX.2 and X.0.1] or also [15; Example 3.6.18], On the other hand, by the 
Fubini theorem, one can show that the functional (2.8) is separately (weak*xweak*)-
continuous; cf. [15; Lemma 3.6.14]. Altogether, the continuity of (2.6)-(2.8) imply 
the separate (weak*xweak*)-continuity of each payoff $1 and $2- Moreover, by the 
continuity of (2.6)-(2.7), $1 + $2 is jointly (weak*xweak*)-continuous because the 
critical term (2.8), which is possibly not jointly continuous, disappears in the sum 
of payoffs. D 
To investigate the geometrical properties of <$/ with / = 1,2, we will have to 
calculate its Gateaux differential with respect to the geometry coming from the 
linear space L^(0,T;rca(IRm ,)) containing U\. This is, in fact, a standard task 
undertaken within derivation of the maximum principle for the relaxed strategies. 
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The needed Frechet differentiability with respect to y can be guaranteed by the 
following assumptions on the partial derivative of <// and G with respect to the 
variable r, denoted respectively by g\(t,r) and G'(t,r): 
3a 6 /^(0,T) 3 6 : ffi-^ ffi continuous: \g',(t,r)\ < a(t) + b(\r\), (2.9a) 
\g\(t, r i) - g\(t, r 2 ) | < (a(t) + 6 ( H ) + 6( | r 2 | ) ) | r l - r 2 | , 
3a G LP(0,T) 3 6 : IR-^ffi continuous: |G'(<, r ) | < a(<) + 6(|r |), (2.9b) 
\G'(t, n ) - G'(<, r 2 ) | < (a(<) + 6 ( H ) + 6 ( | r 2 | ) ) | n - r 2 | , 
where / = 1,2. The maximum principle involves the so-called adjoint terminal-value 
problem 
^L = -Xl(t)G'(t,y(t))-g\(t,y(t)) , X,(T) = 0. (2.10) 
Under the assumption (2.9), the problem (2.10) possesses precisely one solution A/ £ 
KV1,!(0, T; IRn). Following a procedure by Gabasov and Kirillova [5; Section VII.2] or 
(for the general integral processes) by Schmidt [18] developed to prove sufficiency of 
the maximum principle for optimal control problems, we can establish the following 
increment formula. Let us formulate it for $i(-, ^2), the other needed case $2(^1. •) 
being entirely analogous. 
Lemma 2.3. Let ( l . l a - d ) and (2.9) be valid, let v\)v\ £ U\ and 1/2 G cJ2, let 
" = 2/(̂ 1,̂ 2) e V V ^ ^ T j I i r ) be defined by (2.4), and let Ai G H^1'1(0lT;lR
fl) 
solve (2.10) with / = 1. Then 
rp 
Sito.i/iJ-SiKi/a) = 1 1 ^"A,(.,«)[i>i(«-i/i,«](ds)d* 
jo yR», ^ ( 2 1 1 ) 
+ / [A,.(0 + Ai(0AG(i.)]d.-
jo 
where the "Hamiltonian" n\2' is defined by 
n"1
2'X(t,s1):=X(t)H1(t,s1) + h1(t,s1)+ I v(<,si,S2)^,t(ds2) , (2.12) 
and the second-order correcting terms A9l and Ac are defined by 
AS1(0 := .7i(- , i5(0)-5i(- .y(0)-»i(<.»(0)(y(0-iv(0), (---3) 
AC(0 : = G ( . . y ( 0 ) - G ( . , » ( 0 ) - G ' ( . , y ( 0 ) ( 5 ( 0 - y ( 0 ) , (2-14) 
with y = 2/(^1,^2) £ W1,p(0,T;IR r i) being the solution to the initial-value problem 
(2.4) with v\ in place of v\. 
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P r o o f . Using successively the formula (2.12), the equation (2.4) both for v\ and 
for i>i, the by-parts integration and the adjoint equation (2.10), we can calculate: 
rp 




= f 9i(t,y(t))-9i(t,y(t))- f \l(t)H1(t,sl)[i>t-^](dsl)dt 
JO JRm. 
= JQ \gi(t,y(t))-9i(t,y(t)) + x,(t) (c(t,y(t)) - G(t,y(t)) -
 d ( ^ ( ° d ~
y ( 0 ) ) ] 
= J \9i(t,y(t))-9i(t,y(t)) + Xi(i)(G(t,y(t)) - G(t,y(t))) + ^fW) - 2/(0) 
9i(t, y(t))~9i(t, y(t))-g[(t,y(t)) (y(t) - y(t)) 







+ Xi(t)AG(t)dt. • 
The formula (2.11) enables us to investigate convexity of the extended cost func­
tional $i(-,z>'2). Of course, analogous considerations apply also to $2(vi} •). Let us 
take BR := {r e HI"; \r\ < R} a sufficiently large ball so that [y(u\, u2)](t) e BR for 
any uiecJi, u2eU2 and any / e ( 0 , T ) , where y(uu u2)e KV
ljP(0,T; HI") denotes the 
unique solution to (1.3); this means we can put R:= supU i € f / i supU2Gf/2 ||j/(i-i, u2)\\ 
C(0.T;Htn). Furthermore, let 
ax(t) := sup |<7i(*,r)| , a2(t) := sup \g'2(t,r)\ , A(t) := sup \G'(t,r)\. (2.15) 
\r\<R \r\<R \r\<R 
Note that (2.9) ensures certainly ai,a2,A e L^OjT). Thus we may put 
b\(t):=J a i ( r ) d r , b2(t) := J a 2 ( r ) d r , B(t) := J A(r)dr. (2.16) 
Lemma 2.4. Let (1.1) and (2.9) be valid, and let G(t, •) be twice continuously 
differentiable, and let gi(t, •) be uniformly convex on BR in the sense 
Vr, re BR: <?,(*, r) - <//(*, r) - g[(t, r) (r - r) > a(t)\r - r|2 (2.17) 
with a modulus c/ satisfying 
ci(t)>bt(t)e
B^ sup |G"(*,r)l (2.18) 
2 \r\<R 
for / = 1,2. Then, for any V\ e U\ and v2 e U2y the extended payoffs $i(-,z>'2) : 
Ui -> IR and $2(i/i, •) : U2 -+ IR defined in (2.3)-(2.4) are convex. 
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P r o o f . Let us show the case $i(-,i>2); the opponent's case ^2(v\) ) being anal­
ogous. 
From the adjoint equation (2.10) with / = 1, we can estimate d|Ai|/dt < |dAi/d/| 
< ^4(/)|Ai(^)| -f a>i(t) so that by the Gronwall inequality one gets 
|Ai(0l < (fa\(T)e-FAW,iedT\ef>iT)dT. (2.19) 
To simplify the notation, using (2.16) we can also (a bit more pessimistically) esti­
mate 
|Ai(0| < b\(t)eB^. (2.20) 
By the Taylor expansion, we can estimate 
\G(t,y(t))-G(t,y(t))-G'(t,y(t))(y(t)-y(i))\ < \ s"P \G"(t,r)\ \y(t) ~ v(t)\2• 
Then (2.17) with (2.18) and (2.20) ensure 
Agi(t) + X\(t)AG(t) > c\(t)\y(t)-y(t)\
2-h*i(t)\™P \G"(t,r)\\y(t)-y(t)\2 
1 V\<R 
> (ci(t) - b\(t)eB^ sup |G"(ť,r) | ] \y(t) - y(t)\2 > 0 
V 2 M<* / 
so that the second right-hand term in (2.11) is non-negative; note that by Lemma 2.1 
and by the continuity of the mapping (v\) v2) i-+ y(v\, v2) we have |[2/(^1, v2)](t)\ < R 
for any (v\,v2) G U\ x U2) which makes (2.17)-(2.18) effective. By [15; Sec­
tion 4.3], the first right-hand term in (2.11) represents just the Gateaux differential 
of ^i(-,i/2) :Ui — IR, i.e. 
rv7 * ( Ml- \ r ^ 1 ( ^ 1 + ^ ( ^ 1 - ^ 1 ) ^ 2 ) -<-»I(I>I,I>2) [ V ^ ^ i ^ i / i , ^ ) ] ^ ! - ! / ! ) := hm - - -
e \ 0 e 
= I i n?M(t,s)[v\>t-v\tt)(ás)< 
JO JIRmi 
with v\)v\ E Ui arbitrary and with the adjoint state Ai and the Hamiltonian 7i\
2' 
defined respectively by (2.10) and (2.12). Therefore we obtained 
*i(i>i, V2) - *i(i>i, V2) ~ [V^$i(^ i , v2)](i>\ - v\) > 0 , (2.21) 
for all i/i,iIi 6C/1, which just says that $i(-, v2) is convex on U\. • 
3. MAIN RESULTS 
We are now ready to formulate the main achievements: existence of the Nash equi­
libria for the relaxed game (JIG), relations between (TIG) and the original game 
(G)} as well as existence of equilibrium sequences for (G)> We will use the Nikaido 
and Isoda generalization [11] of the classical Nash theorem [10]; this generaliza­
tion admits only separately continuous payoffs and is equivalent with the Brouwer 
fixed-point theorem, as pointed out by Kindler [7; Remark 1.2]. 
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Theorem 3.1. Let (1.1), (2.9) and (2.17)-(2.18) for / = 1,2 be valid. Then: 
(i) The relaxed game (7ZG) possesses at least one Nash equilibrium. 
(ii) Every Nash equilibrium of the relaxed game (1ZG) can be attained by an 
equilibrium sequence for the original game (G) imbedded via i\ x i2 into 
L~(0,T;rca(IR m i )) x L~(0,T;rca(IR m 2 )). 
(iii) Conversely, every equilibrium sequence for the original game (G) (imbedded 
via i\ x i2) has a weakly* convergent subsequence and the limit of every such 
a subsequence is a Nash equilibrium for the relaxed game (7ZG)-
P r o o f . By Lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4, we can see that the relaxed problem (7ZG) 
represents a game over the convex compact sets Ui and U2 for the separately con­
tinuous payoffs <&i and <1>2 whose sum is jointly continuous and such that $i(-,^ 2 ) 
and $ 2 (^i , •) are convex. This just guarantees, by Nikaido and Isoda [11], that (7ZG) 
has got at least one Nash equilibrium, as claimed in (i). 
The points (ii) and (iii) follow by Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. In fact, * i : Ui —• IR and 
tf2 : U2 -+ IR in (1.6) are defined by 
* 1 = $l(-,l/2)oii & *2 = ^2(^1,0 o i 2 , (3.1) 
for details see [15; Proposition 7.1.1] and realize the metrizability of the weak* 
topology on U\ and U2, which allows us to work in terms of sequences instead of 
nets. 0 
Corollary 3.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the original game (G) 
possesses an equilibrium sequence, i.e. a sequence {(uk, uk)}keJN satisfying (1.6). 
P r o o f . It follows straightforwardly by the points (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3.1. • 
Corollary 3.2. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 be satisfied and let ip = 0. 
Then the original game (G) possesses an asymptotically Nash equilibrium, i.e. a 
sequence {(uk} u2)}jfeeiN satisfying (1.7). 
P r o o f . Take v\ G U\ and v2 G U2 arbitrary. Furthermore, take a sequence 
{u^HeiN C U2 generating v2 G U2 in the sense 22(1*2) —• v2 weakly* in L^(0,T; 
rca(IRm 2)) and put y = y(v\,v2) and y
k = y(v\,i2(u




^ ( / - 3 / ) | < \G(t,yk(t))-G(t,y(t))\ 
< a(t)\yk(t)-y(t)\ + ck(t), H2(t,4(t))- f H2(t,s)u2tt(ds) 
JJRTn2 
where a G ^(O.T) comes from (1.1c) and ck G L p(0,T) abbreviates ck(t) := 
\H2(tfu$(t)) - fum2 H2(^5)^2,t(ds)|. Likewise (2.19)-(2.20), we can estimate by 
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means of the Gronwall inequality 
|y*(0-y(OI < (fck(T)e-Io<e)dedr]efo<T)dT < (f c\r) dr) eIo <T)dT. 
(3.2) 
Since t2(uk) —• V2 weakly*, we have ck —• 0 weakly in Lp(0,T) and therefore, 
using also the compactness of the imbedding W1,p(OyT) C L°°(0,T), we have got 
supte(0T)f*c
k(T)dT -> 0. In view of (3.2), this shows that yk -> y in L°°(0,T;IRn) 
and this convergence is uniform with respect to v\ G U\. This also imply the 
convergence fQ gi(t,y
k(t))dt —» fQ g\(t,y(t))dt uniformly with respect to v\ G U\. 
Assuming (p = 0, this shows (1.6a) uniformly, i.e. 
lim sup \*i(uuu$)-9^)1 = 0 (3.3) 
k€NUieUl 
with * i defined in (3.1). 
Just analogously, we can also show that (1.6b) holds uniformly provided {u\}keJN 
is such a sequence that {i\(u\)}k£jN weakly* converges. 
In view of Theorem 3.1(i-ii), there is an equilibrium sequence {(u\, uk)}keN f° r 
(Q) such that both {i\(uk)}keJN and {^(u^)}jbeN weakly* converges. Then, by the 
above arguments, (1.8) holds so that by Proposition 1.1 the sequence {(uk, uk)}kejs 
represents an asymptotically Nash equilibrium. • 
Remark 3.1. If the controlled system is linear with respect to the state, i. e. G(t, •) 
is affine, then obviously G" = 0 and one can take c\ = 0 in (2.17) which then just 
requires g\(t} •) and <72(t, •) to be merely convex; cf. e.g. Balder [1], Bensoussan [4] 
or Nowak [13], or also [15; Section 7.3]. 
Remark 3.2. The assumption <p = 0 in Corollary 3.2 is inevitable because oth-
erwise the uniform convergence (3.3) cannot be expected. Indeed, one can use 
the example (p(t,s\,S2) — s\S2 which induces by the formula (2.8) a separately 
(weak*xweak*)-continuous functional U\ x U2 —* IR which is, however, not jointly 
(weak*xweak*)-continuous; cf. [15; Example 3.6.18]. 
Remark 3.3. If the multivalued mapping Si : (0,T) Zj IRmi acting as strategy 
constraints in (Q) is not bounded, several sophisticated approaches based on Cha-
con's biting lemma and the Dunford-Pettis theorem must be still incorporated. For 
details we refer to [15; Section 7.3] where only systems linear with respect to the 
state are considered, however. 
(Received March 2, 1998.) 
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